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Dysfunctional Audit Behaviour: An Exploratory Study in Malaysia 
ABSTRACT 
 
Purpose The quality of the opinion provided by audit firms is an important determinant 
of their long-term survival, but audit quality is difficult to gauge, which makes it 
particularly sensitive to the behaviour of the individuals who carry on audit work. This 
study seeks to identify the incidence of Dysfunctional Audit Behaviours and Audit 
Quality Reduction Behaviours, actions taken by an auditor during engagement that 
reduce evidence-gathering effectiveness. 
Design/methodology /approach The study is based on a survey of 244 auditors working 
in small/medium and big audit firms in Malaysia. 
Findings The study identified key variables leading to dysfunctional audit behaviour. 
Research limitations/implications The study is subject to the normal limitations 
associated with survey research. 
Practical implications The study provides basic empirical evidence of a potentially 
serious risk of dysfunctional behaviours that may impair audit quality. 
Originality/value The study provides empirical evidence to address the concerns of the  
Malaysian regulatory authorities regarding audit quality. 
Keywords audit behaviour; audit quality; audit risk; dysfunctional behaviour 
Paper type Research paper 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore the incidence of dysfunctional audit behaviour, 
specifically pre-mature sign off (PMSO), specific audit quality reduction behaviour 
(AQRB) and the effect of time budget pressure, which is one of the key operational and 
management control mechanisms in an audit assignment. Auditors generally perceive that 
their performance evaluation and career advancement in an audit firm are strongly related 
to their ability to complete an audit assignment on time and within the budget. At the 
same time, they are also expected to accomplish audit tasks to enable the formulation of 
an opinion in accordance to relevance auditing standards and guidelines.  The results of a 
number studies show that time budgets are difficult to attain and this can affect audit 
quality (Kelley and Margheim, 1990; Cook and Kelley, 1988; Dalton and Kelley, 1997). 
 
 
2.0 Audit Quality and Time Budget Pressure 
 
Audit quality has been defined in numerous ways. The practitioner literature often 
defines audit quality relative to the degree to which the audit conforms to applicable 
auditing standards (Watkins et al., 2004). Some empirical audit quality research 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Wooten, 2003) defines audit quality relative to audit risk which is the 
risk that an auditor may fail to modify the opinion on financial statements that are 
materially misstated. DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as ‘the market-assessed joint 
probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting 
system, and (b) report the breach’. At the heart of audit is a tension between cost and 
quality (McNair, 1991). The long run sustainability of the profession depends upon the 
perceived quality of audit as a product and the maintenance of its reputation demands 
investment of time and high calibre of staff in audit work (Watkins et al., 2004; Wilson 
and Grimlund, 1990). The dilemma is intensified by the fact that audit quality is by 
nature difficult to observe and measure.  
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Since the quality of the audit cannot readily be evaluated, reputation therefore acts as a 
surrogate for quality. The market place for audit services has become increasingly 
competitive and audit fees have fallen considerably. Beattie and Fearnley (1994) 
concluded that there is significant downward pressure on audit fees generally, and 
particularly large reductions in fees when audits are put to tender. Faced with this 
situation, audit firms are under pressure to decrease man-hours in order to keep margins 
at an acceptable level. These competitive pressures may result in quality compromises 
which are not detectable in the short term by either clients or audit firm management. 
This places a particularly heavy burden on an audit firm’s control systems, in that very 
tight cost control needs to be achieved in a manner which does not reduce audit quality. 
Margheim and Pany (1986) revealed that tight budgets often lead auditors to omit parts of 
the audit program, thus leading to lower audit quality. A subsequent survey by Kelley and 
Margheim (1990) highlighted similar findings. Coram et al (2003) suggested that the 
level of time budget pressure impacts on the propensity to compromise audit quality and 
found that under such pressure auditors do consider the level of risk to the audit task 
whilst executing the audit.  
 
 
3.0 Dysfunctional Behaviour 
Dysfunctional behaviour has its origins in Argyris’ (1952) seminal case-study oriented 
paper. This term describes the “...organisational and behavioural effects seen in 
supervisors induced by the use of budgeting” (Hartmann, 2000) and refers to the 
violation of control system rules and procedures (Jaworski and Young, 1992). Hartmann 
(2000) contends that dysfunctional behaviour is not just an ‘irrational’ human tendency, 
but rather reactions that can be ‘rationally’ expected in response to controls and 
processes. The extent to which such controls are perceived to impact on performance, 
evaluation and rewards, is also viewed as having an impact on managerial stress and 
tension, thus leading to potential dysfunctional behaviour. 
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Certain actions of auditors that result in substandard audits have been termed as 
dysfunctional audit behaviours. Dysfunctional behaviour has also been referred to as 
reduced audit quality behaviour (Otley and Pierce, 1996; Coram et al., 2003). A variety 
of these cover behaviour such as failure to research an accounting principle, pre-mature 
sign off (PMSO) of audit procedures, superficial review of documents, acceptance of 
weak client explanations and reduction of work on an audit step below the acceptable 
level. These behaviours may pose a direct threat to the quality of the audit.  
 
A second form of dysfunctional behaviour is underreporting of the actual time (URT) 
spent on specific auditing tasks (Donnelly et al., 2003). This occurs when auditors 
complete chargeable work on their own time and is usually motivated by a desire to avoid 
or minimise budget over-runs (Lightner et al., 1982). Although this type of behaviour 
does not pose an immediate threat to audit quality, it may lead to undesirable 
consequences such as inaccurate staff evaluations, lost revenue for the firm, unrealistic 
future budgets and dysfunctional audit behaviour on future audits.   
 
Several studies have surveyed auditors about their perceptions of and participation in 
different types of dysfunctional audit behaviour. Rhode (1977) found 55 percent of 
experienced auditors (i.e., greater than three years experience) surveyed and Lightner et 
al. (1982) found 67 percent of the Big 8 auditors surveyed admitted to URT. Rhode 
(1977) also found 60 percent of experienced auditors had pre-maturely signed off on an 
audit step without actually performing it, while Alderman and Deitrick (1982) found 31 
percent of the Big 8 auditors surveyed acknowledged that PMSO occurs in practice. More 
generally, Willett and Page (1996) found that only 22 percent of the finalists taking the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants examination in England and Wales stated that they 
had never participated in speeding up of audit testing by irregular methods and Coram et 
al. (2003) found that almost two-thirds of Australian respondents had ‘sometimes’ 
performed reduced audit quality practices. Kelley and Margheim (1990) found over one-
half of the auditors surveyed stated that they had engaged in dysfunctional audit 
behaviours on a recent audit.   
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4.0 Research Questions 
 
4.1 Pre-mature Sign-Off (PMSO) 
A significant part of the literature on reduced audit quality has focused on PMSO as one 
primary type of reduced audit quality behaviour (Rhode, 1977; Alderman and Deitrick, 
1982; Margheim and Pany, 1986; Otley and Pierce, 1996; Pierce and Sweeney, 2005). 
The most common aspects identified in the literature have included rejecting awkward 
items from a sample and accepting doubtful audit evidence. PMSO occurs when  the 
auditors signs off a required audit step, not covered by an alternative audit step, without 
actually completing the work or noting the omission (Otley and Pierce, 1996). Previous 
studies identified time pressures as one of the significant reasons for PMSO. The 
consequences of this behaviour are potentially serious, since it interferes directly with the 
control systems which support the final audit opinion. 
  
The specific questions addressed in this study on PMSO are: 
Research Question 1: Whether Malaysian auditors have engaged in PMSO? 
Research Question 2: What are the audits areas in which these behaviours are 
most prevalent? 
Research Question 3: What are the variables leading to PMSO? 
 
4.2 Audit Quality Reduction Behaviour (AQRB) 
AQRB refers to a number of specific behaviours, in addition to PMSO, which directly 
threaten audit quality, such as accepting weak client explanations and making only a 
superficial review of documents. Research Question 4 on AQRB is addressed in this 
study: During the year, how often have auditors engaged in specific AQRB when 
carrying out an audit?  
 
The survey questionnaire listed four specific types of AQRB examined by Kelley and 
Margheim (1990) and Otley and Pierce (1996). The purpose of this study is to assess the 
existence of such dysfunctional behaviour among the different levels of audit personnel. 
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4.3 Time Budget Pressure and Under Reporting of Time (URT) 
 
Time budget pressure refers to those time constraints that arise or may arise, in 
engagements from limitations of resources (time) allocated to perform tasks (De Zoort 
and Lord, 1997). Normally audit firms communicate these limitations to audit personnel 
through time budgets. Research shows that time budgets have the potential to create 
pressure because these budgets act not only as a control mechanism but also as a 
performance measurement tools within the firm. The results of a number studies show 
that time budgets are difficult to attain and this can affect audit quality (Kelley and 
Margheim, 1990; Cook and Kelley, 1998; Dalton and Kelley, 1997). Also, some studies 
show that auditors believe this pressure is escalating (Waggoner and Cashell, 1991; Otley 
and Pierce, 1996). In contrast, a more recent study has shown that time budgets are 
becoming more realistic (Buchheit et al., 2003).  
URT arises when an auditor carries out chargeable work and does not charge it to the 
client for whom the work has been done. Although this behaviour does not immediately 
affect audit quality, it does result in artificially low time records and it may lead to 
undesirable consequences such as inaccurate staff evaluations, lost revenue for the firm, 
unrealistic future budgets and audit quality reduction behaviour on future audits. URT is 
likely to lead to very tight time budgets, which previous studies (Alderman and Deitrick, 
1982; Otley and Pierce, 1996) have highlighted as being a major cause of dysfunctional 
behaviour but need not necessarily lead to a reduction in audit quality. As the ability to 
meet time budgets was considered a ‘very important’ factor affecting advancement and 
performance evaluation in the audit firms, URT has become a relatively easy strategy for 
auditors (Rhode, 1977; Lightner et al., 1982; Pierce and Sweeney, 2005).  
 
The auditors were given six options to choose from, these could be classified as 
functional responses (request and obtain budget increases and work harder but charge all 
time properly) and dysfunctional responses (URT by working on personal time, shift time 
to non-chargeable code, reduce the quality of audit work to meet budget and shift time to 
8 
 
a different client. These responses allowed two further research questions to be 
addressed: 
Research Question 5: Do time-budget pressures cause audit personnel to engage in 
dysfunctional behaviour? and, 
Research Question 6: Do time budget pressures cause the under-reporting of 
engagement time? 
 
5.0 Data Collection 
 
Participants for this exploratory study are Malaysian auditors in public practice. A 
random sample of 244 auditors was obtained from the audit firms listed with the 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA). The 244 auditors comprised 131 audit staff; 
18 audit seniors; 80 audit managers and 15 partners of firms, ranging from small and 
medium size to the ‘Big 4’ firms. A questionnaire was developed from the original 
version of Otley and Pierce (1996) and was distributed late in 2007. 
 
6.0 Results and Discussion 
 
The analysis and discussion of the results are structured around the answers to the six 
research questions specified above. Thus the responses relating to Research Question 1 
allows us to conclude that a PMSO problem exists, with 57 percent of respondents 
admitting to signing-off prematurely. 
 
Data from Table 1 address Research Question 2, and indicates that the incidence of 
PMSO is most common in the review/testing of the Internal Control System (ICS), 
followed by PMSO at the time of vouching of expenses. The same two areas were 
highlighted by Alderman and Deitrick (1982) and Otley and Pierce (1996). ANOVA 
analysis revealed that these two areas had a significantly greater likelihood of PMSO than 
other major areas of the audit (F=82.16; p=.000). These same two areas are expected to 
have a higher incidence of PMSO because of the relatively small amount of working 
paper documentation involved (Alderman and Deitrick, 1982). Besides, the 
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review/testing of ICS and vouching and expenses are concerned only with the existence 
and completeness of transaction on audit assertions and objectives. In addition, the 
auditor can use the previous year’s recorded understanding and assessment of ICS.  
 
By comparison, Raghunathan’s (1991) US study, found that PMSO are perceived as most 
likely to occur during the analytical review stage, followed by PMSO at the time of 
checking the internal auditor’s work and supervision of the work of subordinates. Again, 
as expected the least likely areas of PMSO incidence are cash, accounts receivable and 
account payable. These three accounts are interrelated by cash, as cash is involved in cash 
sales, credit sales (receivables) and cash payments (payable). These are the critical areas 
of audit where auditors have to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence about each 
significant assertion for the applicable transactions and balances. All assertion categories 
need to be confirmed at the audit working paper stage. The high levels of working papers 
prepared for these areas explain why they are the least likely to be subject to PMSO. 
Auditors have to use various combinations of tests of control and substantive procedures 
in order to meet all assertion categories in these accounts:  existence or occurrence, 
completeness, rights and obligations, valuation or measurement and disclosure. 
 
Participants were then presented with a list of possible causes of PMSO, based on 
Alderman and Deitrick (1982) and Otley and Pierce (1996). The perceived importance of 
these possible causes, ranked in descending order, is shown in Table 2. Budget 
constraints and the perceived necessity of an audit step have been highlighted as major 
causes of PMSO and dysfunctional audit behaviour, thus providing an answer to 
Research Question 3. 
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Table 1 
Perceived PMSO in Areas of Audit 
    
 
 
Table 2 
Perceived Importance of the Causes of PMSO 
 
Area Mean 
Score 
SD % of Respondents who 
reported that PMSO occur 
at least sometimes 
Review/testing ICS 3.24 1.11 78 
Vouching of expenses 3.25 1.12 75 
Other Inventory 2.41 0.85 43 
Fixed Assets 2.26 0.83 38 
Physical Inventory Count 2.19 0.83 32 
Accounts Payable 2.09 0.68 24 
Accounts Receivable 2.10 0.65 23 
Cash 1.89 1.76 16 
Perceived Cause Mean Score SD 
An audit step appearing unnecessary/immaterial 4.05 1.12 
Time budget constraint 3.83 1.01 
Client imposed deadline 3.57 1.07 
Inclination to readily accept client explanations 3.01 1.02 
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Respondents were asked to indicate the frequency of each of the specific AQRB within 
the last year practices. Their responses are listed in Table 3 and all responses are close to 
2 (i.e., the ‘rarely’ category), indicating that none of the individual behaviours are 
widespread. However, of some concern is the fact that 72 percent of all respondents 
admitted to engaging in one or more of the specified behaviours, at least ‘sometimes’. 
 
 
Table 3 
Frequency of Specific Audit Quality reduction Behaviour (AQRB) 
 
AQRB Behaviour Mean Score SD 
Made superficial reviews of documents 2.24 0.89 
Accepted weak explanations from client 2.15 0.86 
Reduced amount of work below level considered reasonable 2.09 1.10 
Failed to research an accounting principle 1.91 0.84 
 
 
 
A summary of the results presented in Table 4 addresses Research Questions 5 and 6. 
Ranking based on mean scores showed that the most likely response to a tight budget is 
to ‘work harder but charge all time properly’, followed by URT by working on personal 
time and quality reduction of audit work in meeting budget.  
 
Table 5 presents the comparison of results of the present study with those of Kelley and 
Seiler (1982) and Otley and Pierce (1996). This comparison provides some evidence that 
Inadequate supervision 2.83 0.94 
Desire to obtain a favourable evaluation 2.83 1.27 
Dislike for the work required 2.70 1.09 
Misunderstanding of professional responsibilities 2.69 1.01 
Lack of technical knowledge 2.53 0.95 
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auditors are less likely to request and obtain an increase in their budgets. ‘Work harder 
but charge all time properly’ is the most common response. ‘Reduce the quality of work 
to meet budget’ is reported higher for the present study compared to those reported in the 
US by Kelley and Seiler (1982). In comparison, Malaysian auditors are more likely to 
engage in dysfunctional behaviour involving ‘quality reduction of audit work to meet 
budget’ than their Irish counterparts from Otley and Pierce (1996).   
 
Table 4 
Responses to Tight Budget 
 
Response to Tight Budget Mean Score SD 
Work harder but charge all time properly 3.31 1.16 
URT by working on personal time 2.82 1.43 
Reduce the quality of audit work to meet budget 2.41 1.20 
Request and obtain an increase in the budget 2.16 1.10 
Shift time to a non-chargeable code 2.16 1.08 
Shift time to a different client 1.51 0.75 
 
Table 5 
Responses to Tight Budget: Comparison of Study 
Response to Tight Budget Kelley and 
Seiler 
(1982) 
- US Study 
Otley and 
Pierce  
(1996) 
- Irish Study 
This 
Study 
Work harder but charge all time properly 90% 75% 81% 
URT by working on personal time 33% 54% 42% 
Reduce the quality of audit work to meet 
budget 
10% 36% 40% 
Request and obtain an increase in the budget 57% 36% 43% 
Shift time to a non-chargeable code 19% 40% 29% 
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Figures 1 and 2 show the breakdown of participants’ responses to tight budgets or time 
budget pressures by position and by type of firm (Big 4 and non-Big 4). Figure 1 shows 
functional responses and Figure 2 shows dysfunctional responses. Partners and Managers 
(P&M) i.e. auditors holding higher-ranks, as well as auditors holding lower-ranks i.e. 
Staffs and Seniors (S&S), both appear to resort to functional and dysfunctional means in 
coping with pressure 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Responses to budget pressure by type of firm and type of position 
- Functional responses 
 
Request and obtain budget increases
25 24 25
42
52 47
37
48
37
48 32 40
48
28
38
10 16 13
     Big Firm -
P&M
     Non Big
Firm - P&M
Total - P&M     Big Firm -
S&S
    Non Big
Firm - S&S
Total - S&S 
%
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  Notes to Figure 1: 
Participants responded to a Likert-type scale of 1 to 5 (1= never; 2=rarely; 
3=sometimes; 4=often; 5=nearly always). In this figure, the two responses i.e. 
never and rarely are classified as ‘Rarely’ and often and nearly always as ‘Often’. 
 
Figure 1 shows about a third of the partners and managers (for both ‘big 4’ and non-big 4 
firms i.e. 38%) requested and obtained budget increases often, only 13% of the auditors 
holding lower-ranks tend to do so (for both big and non-big firm). This may indicate that 
those holding lower-rank positions are reluctant to come forward with budget increase 
requests. The responses of the two groups (P&M and S&S) are significant at the 0.01 
level, where auditors in P&M group admitted making requests for budget increases more 
often than S&S. This is consistent with an expectation on the part of managers and 
partners that they will succeed in obtaining budget changes, while staff and seniors may 
be less successful. Respondents for both groups also indicated that they often worked 
harder and charged all time properly when faced with stricter time budgets. This is 
evident from 48% for P&M group and 45% for S&S group (i.e., no statistically 
significant difference between the two user groups). 
 
Work harder but charge all time properly
12
24 18 18 16 17
19
48
34
45
32 38
69
28
48
33
52 45
     Big Firm -
P&M
     Non Big
Firm - P&M
Total - P&M     Big Firm -
S&S
    Non Big
Firm - S&S
Total S&S
%
Rarely Sometimes Often
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Figure 2 illustrates the responses on dysfunctional behaviour. Both groups resort to some 
dysfunctional activity to cope with time budget pressure. For example, 25%, 32% and 
30% of P&M group, at least sometimes, tend to URT either by working in personal time, 
by shifting time to non-chargeable or by shifting time to different client respectively. 
Whereas for the S&S group at 22%, 35% and 34% on the same dysfunctional responses. 
These high percentages may be construed as a warning that URT is a common practice 
among auditors at all levels in Malaysia. This tendency might be a strategy for avoiding 
budget over-runs by the S&S group. Auditors at the lower-ranks (S&S) also tended to 
reduce the quality of audit work when faced with the tight time budgets. This is evident 
from Figure 2 as many auditors indicated, at least sometimes, responding to tight budgets 
by reducing the quality of audit work i.e. Partners/Managers at 7% and Seniors/Staffs at 
23% (Often at 7%). Accordingly, audit personnel holding relatively lower ranks (S&S) 
are sometimes responding to time budget pressure with extreme measures. The responses 
of the two groups (P&M and S&S) are significantly different here at the 0.05 level, with 
auditors in S&S group admitting to undertaking quality reduction acts.   
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Figure 2: Responses to budget pressure by type of firm and type of position 
- Dysfunctional responses 
 
 
Under-reporting of Time (URT) by working on personal time
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  Notes to Figure 2: 
Participants responded to a Likert-type scale of 1 to 5 (1= never; 2=rarely; 
3=sometimes; 4=often; 5=nearly always). In this figure, the two responses i.e. 
never and rarely are classified as ‘Rarely’ and often and nearly always as ‘Often’. 
 
Shift time to non-chargeable code
58 64 61
46
60 53
35 28 32
44
26 35
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     Big Firm -
P&M
     Non Big
Firm - P&M
Total - P&M     Big Firm -
S&S
    Non Big
Firm - S&S
Total S&S
%
Shift time to a different client
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Total S&S
%
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Figure 2 continued 
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As budget attainability or achievement is significantly positively related to performance 
evaluation (Kelley and Seiler, 1982; Cook and Kelley, 1988; Otley and Pierce, 1996), 
respondents were asked direct questions on the perceived importance of budget 
achievement in the overall evaluation of performance. There was evidence that budget 
achievement is seen by many respondents as being critical for a successful career in 
auditing. They were asked how important time budget achievement is in the overall 
evaluation of performance (Perceived), and their opinion of how important time budget 
achievement should be (Desired). Responses for Audit Managers are summarised in 
Table 6 : 
 
Table 6 
Importance of Budget Achievement in the Evaluation of  
Audit Manager’s Performance 
              Perceived          Desired 
 Very Important  38.3%      8.3% 
 Quite Important  33.2%      31% 
 Of Some Importance   26.3%      52% 
 Of Little Importance  4.6%      7.6% 
 Of No Importance  1.2%      1.1% 
 
 
Table 6 indicates a strong feeling that budget achievement is given too much importance 
in the overall evaluation of performance. It is observed that time budgets are perceived to 
be ‘very important’ to ‘quite important’ (71.5% and 26.3% of respondents selected ‘of 
some importance’). Surprisingly, when desired importance of budget achievement in the 
overall evaluation of performance is measured, half of the respondents observed a lower 
level of importance i.e. ‘of some importance’. There seems to be a general acceptance 
that a certain amount of budget pressure is an unavoidable fact of life in auditing firms. 
Managers felt that, ideally, budget achievement should be ‘of some importance’ with 
respect to their performance evaluation. 
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Respondents’ perceptions on the attainability of their budgets in the last year are shown 
in Table 7. More than half of all respondents believed that last year’s time budget were 
either difficult to attain or unattainable. Table 7 and Table 8 (for comparative studies) 
indicate that more than half of respondents considered their time budget to be 
unattainable or difficult to attain. Accordingly, Malaysian auditors considered their time 
budget to be ‘unattainable’ to a slightly higher degree than their Irish and New Zealand 
counterparts, but lower at a ‘difficult to attain’ degree, i.e., 32% as compared to Irish 
(58.1%) and New Zealand (50%).  
 
Table 7 
Perceived Budget Attainability 
 Response    % of Respondents 
 Attainable     29.8% 
 Difficult to Attain    32% 
 Unattainable     38.2% 
 
 
Table 8 
Perceived Budget Attainability: Comparison of Study  
 
Response  This  Study Otley and 
Pierce (1996) 
- Irish Study 
Liyanarachchi and 
McNamara  
(2007) 
- New Zealand Study 
 
Attainable 29.8% 25.4% 31% 
Difficult to Attain 32% 58.1% 50% 
Unattainable 38.2% 16.5% 19% 
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7.0 Conclusions 
 
 
The study yields persuasive empirical evidence of the existence of dysfunctional 
behaviour involving PMSO, specific AQRB and some aspects of URT and time budget 
pressure. The study also produced important findings in relation to auditor’s control 
system on time budget and budget emphasis. In general, many auditors in Malaysia think 
that time budgets are difficult to attain. Auditors seem to resort to practices such as URT 
and shifting to non-chargeable code and different client when faced with time budget 
pressure. The variations in the perceived levels of PMSO across different areas of audit is 
also a notable result as it would enable peer reviewers and practice reviewers to focus on 
key areas with higher probabilities of PMSO.  
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